MTSA: Multi-turn Safety Alignment for LLMs through Multi-round Red-teaming
Weiyang Guo, Jing Li, Wenya Wang, Yu Li, Daojing He, Jun Yu, Min Zhang
Abstract
The proliferation of jailbreak attacks against large language models (LLMs) highlights the need for robust security measures. However, in multi-round dialogues, malicious intentions may be hidden in interactions, leading LLMs to be more prone to produce harmful responses. In this paper, we propose the Multi-Turn Safety Alignment (MTSA) framework, to address the challenge of securing LLMs in multi-round interactions. It consists of two stages: In the thought-guided attack learning stage, the red-team model learns about thought-guided multi-round jailbreak attacks to generate adversarial prompts. In the adversarial iterative optimization stage, the red-team model and the target model continuously improve their respective capabilities in interaction. Furthermore, we introduce a multi-turn reinforcement learning algorithm based on future rewards to enhance the robustness of safety alignment. Experimental results show that the red-team model exhibits state-of-the-art attack capabilities, while the target model significantly improves its performance on safety benchmarks.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{guo-etal-2025-mtsa,
title = "{MTSA}: Multi-turn Safety Alignment for {LLM}s through Multi-round Red-teaming",
author = "Guo, Weiyang and
Li, Jing and
Wang, Wenya and
Li, Yu and
He, Daojing and
Yu, Jun and
Zhang, Min",
editor = "Che, Wanxiang and
Nabende, Joyce and
Shutova, Ekaterina and
Pilehvar, Mohammad Taher",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 63rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)",
month = jul,
year = "2025",
address = "Vienna, Austria",
publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
url = "https://aclanthology.org/2025.acl-long.1282/",
doi = "10.18653/v1/2025.acl-long.1282",
pages = "26424--26442",
ISBN = "979-8-89176-251-0"
}