Reinforcement Learning for Mean Field Games with Strategic Complementarities
Kiyeob Lee, Desik Rengarajan, Dileep Kalathil, Srinivas Shakkottai
Abstract
Mean Field Games (MFG) are the class of games with a very large number of agents and the standard equilibrium concept is a Mean Field Equilibrium (MFE). Algorithms for learning MFE in dynamic MFGs are unknown in general. Our focus is on an important subclass that possess a monotonicity property called Strategic Complementarities (MFG-SC). We introduce a natural refinement to the equilibrium concept that we call Trembling-Hand-Perfect MFE (T-MFE), which allows agents to employ a measure of randomization while accounting for the impact of such randomization on their payoffs. We propose a simple algorithm for computing T-MFE under a known model. We also introduce a model-free and a model-based approach to learning T-MFE and provide sample complexities of both algorithms. We also develop a fully online learning scheme that obviates the need for a simulator. Finally, we empirically evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithms via examples motivated by real-world applications.
BibTeX
@InProceedings{pmlr-v130-lee21b,
title = { Reinforcement Learning for Mean Field Games with Strategic Complementarities },
author = {Lee, Kiyeob and Rengarajan, Desik and Kalathil, Dileep and Shakkottai, Srinivas},
booktitle = {Proceedings of The 24th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics},
pages = {2458--2466},
year = {2021},
editor = {Banerjee, Arindam and Fukumizu, Kenji},
volume = {130},
series = {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research},
month = {13--15 Apr},
publisher = {PMLR},
pdf = {http://proceedings.mlr.press/v130/lee21b/lee21b.pdf},
url = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v130/lee21b.html},
abstract = { Mean Field Games (MFG) are the class of games with a very large number of agents and the standard equilibrium concept is a Mean Field Equilibrium (MFE). Algorithms for learning MFE in dynamic MFGs are unknown in general. Our focus is on an important subclass that possess a monotonicity property called Strategic Complementarities (MFG-SC). We introduce a natural refinement to the equilibrium concept that we call Trembling-Hand-Perfect MFE (T-MFE), which allows agents to employ a measure of randomization while accounting for the impact of such randomization on their payoffs. We propose a simple algorithm for computing T-MFE under a known model. We also introduce a model-free and a model-based approach to learning T-MFE and provide sample complexities of both algorithms. We also develop a fully online learning scheme that obviates the need for a simulator. Finally, we empirically evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithms via examples motivated by real-world applications. }
}