ICASSP 2023accepted0 citations
A Radar-Jammer Zero-Sum Repeated Bayesian Game
Sofia Suvorova, Ali Pezeshki, Ross Kyprianou, Bill Moran
Abstract
We consider an instance of a radar jamming countermeasure problem, where the radar and the jammer have uncertainty about the radar environment (for instance, about the noise variance and the radar cross section variance), and they have to account for these uncertainties with statistical priors. The radar-jammer interaction is modelled as a two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian game (also called an incomplete information game). We discuss the computation of the optimal strategies and present numerical results that illustrate the optimal strategies in an example.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{icassp2023_aradarjammerzero,
title = {A Radar-Jammer Zero-Sum Repeated Bayesian Game},
author = {Sofia Suvorova and Ali Pezeshki and Ross Kyprianou and Bill Moran},
booktitle = {ICASSP 2023},
year = {2023}
}