Toward Forward-Secure End-to-End Data Sharing: An Attribute-Key-Free CP-ABE Scheme

Abstract

In end-to-end data sharing, data are directly distributed to data receivers and stored on their terminals, making it hard to ensure forward security because receivers whose permissions have been revoked may still access previously shared data. To address these challenges, we propose an attribute-key-free CP-ABE scheme, aimed at securely binding data with access policies while ensuring forward security. Specifically, the decryption process in our scheme is delegated to the attribute authorities, which adopt the user’s real-time attribute values to decrypt the ciphertext. To prevent the honest-but-curious attribute authorities from accessing the plaintext, the ciphertext is re-encrypted with a one-time key before being sent to the attribute authorities. Furthermore, to prevent sensitive information from being inferred through the policy, we design a policy-hiding mechanism to conceal attribute values. Through these mechanisms, it can be ensured that the data subject always has control over his or her personal data during the end-to-end data-sharing process. We evaluate the performance of our scheme through both theoretical analysis and comparative experiments, and the results show our scheme’s effectiveness.