Generalized Strategic Classification and the Case of Aligned Incentives
Abstract
Strategic classification studies learning in settings where self-interested users can strategically modify their features to obtain favorable predictive outcomes. A key working assumption, however, is that “favorable” always means “positive”; this may be appropriate in some applications (e.g., loan approval), but reduces to a fairly narrow view of what user interests can be. In this work we argue for a broader perspective on what accounts for strategic user behavior, and propose and study a flexible model of generalized strategic classification. Our generalized model subsumes most current models but includes other novel settings; among these, we identify and target one intriguing sub-class of problems in which the interests of users and the system are aligned. This setting reveals a surprising fact: that standard max-margin losses are ill-suited for strategic inputs. Returning to our fully generalized model, we propose a novel max-margin framework for strategic learning that is practical and effective, and which we analyze theoretically. We conclude with a set of experiments that empirically demonstrate the utility of our approach.
BibTeX
@InProceedings{pmlr-v162-levanon22a,
title = {Generalized Strategic Classification and the Case of Aligned Incentives},
author = {Levanon, Sagi and Rosenfeld, Nir},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 39th International Conference on Machine Learning},
pages = {12593--12618},
year = {2022},
editor = {Chaudhuri, Kamalika and Jegelka, Stefanie and Song, Le and Szepesvari, Csaba and Niu, Gang and Sabato, Sivan},
volume = {162},
series = {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research},
month = {17--23 Jul},
publisher = {PMLR},
pdf = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v162/levanon22a/levanon22a.pdf},
url = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v162/levanon22a.html},
abstract = {Strategic classification studies learning in settings where self-interested users can strategically modify their features to obtain favorable predictive outcomes. A key working assumption, however, is that “favorable” always means “positive”; this may be appropriate in some applications (e.g., loan approval), but reduces to a fairly narrow view of what user interests can be. In this work we argue for a broader perspective on what accounts for strategic user behavior, and propose and study a flexible model of generalized strategic classification. Our generalized model subsumes most current models but includes other novel settings; among these, we identify and target one intriguing sub-class of problems in which the interests of users and the system are aligned. This setting reveals a surprising fact: that standard max-margin losses are ill-suited for strategic inputs. Returning to our fully generalized model, we propose a novel max-margin framework for strategic learning that is practical and effective, and which we analyze theoretically. We conclude with a set of experiments that empirically demonstrate the utility of our approach.}
}