INDEXGUARD: Index-only Backdoor Vetting for Secure Federated PEFT of Large Language Models

Abstract

Federated parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) enables customizing large language models on private data, yet it is vulnerable to backdoor poisoning—especially when privacy constraints prevent inspection of per-client real-valued updates. We exploit the intuition that poisoning leaves a similar backdoor imprint in which adapter coordinates become salient, so overlap in salient-index supports remains informative even without values. We introduce IndexGuard, an unsupervised index-only vetting primitive in which clients send only Top-$K$ salient update indices and the server operates on the induced overlap geometry, clustering clients and filtering cohesion-outlier groups before aggregation. We analyze support stability under bounded rescaling and separability under shared-trigger poisoning under non-IID drift. Across attacks, backbones, and PEFT variants, IndexGuard provides end-to-end mitigation, preserving clean accuracy while achieving performance comparable to centralized methods.