Architecture Matters for Multi-Agent Security

Abstract

Multi-agent systems (MAS), composed of networks of two or more autonomous AI agents, have become increasingly popular in production deployments, yet introduce security risks that do not arise in single-agent settings. Even if individual agents may exhibit robust security, architectural decisions governing their coordination can create attack surfaces that have not been systematically characterized. In this work, we present an empirical study of how MAS design decisions shape the tradeoff between task performance and attack resistance. Using a network of web-based agents and stage-wise evaluations that distinguish planning-stage refusal, execution-stage interception, and successful attack completion, we study architectural choices through controlled experiments. We identify three key design choices that influence MAS security: (i) agent roles, which determine how authority and responsibility are allocated; (ii) topology, which shapes how and when agents interact; and (iii) memory, which determines the context and state visibility accessible to each agent. Overall, our results show that security and performance in multi-agent systems are governed by architectural design choices, motivating the development of further evaluations which move beyond the security properties of a single agent.