IJCAI 2022poster2 citations

Voting in Two-Crossing Elections

Andrei Constantinescu, Roger Wattenhofer

Abstract

We introduce two-crossing elections as a generalization of single-crossing elections, showing a number of new results. First, we show that two-crossing elections can be recognized in polynomial time, by reduction to the well-studied consecutive ones problem. Single-crossing elections exhibit a transitive majority relation, from which many important results follow. On the other hand, we show that the classical Debord-McGarvey theorem can still be proven two-crossing, implying that any weighted majority tournament is inducible by a two-crossing election. This shows that many voting rules are NP-hard under two-crossing elections, including Kemeny and Slater. This is in contrast to the single-crossing case and outlines an important complexity boundary between single- and two-crossing. Subsequently, we show that for two-crossing elections the Young scores of all candidates can be computed in polynomial time, by formulating a totally unimodular linear program. Finally, we consider the Chamberlin-Courant rule with arbitrary disutilities and show that a winning committee can be computed in polynomial time, using an approach based on dynamic programming.

Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice
BibTeX
@inproceedings{ijcai2022p30,
  title     = {Voting in Two-Crossing Elections},
  author    = {Constantinescu, Andrei and Wattenhofer, Roger},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on
               Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-22}},
  publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization},
  editor    = {Lud De Raedt},
  pages     = {208--214},
  year      = {2022},
  month     = {7},
  note      = {Main Track},
  doi       = {10.24963/ijcai.2022/30},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/30},
}
Voting in Two-Crossing Elections · IJCAI 2022