IJCAI 2022poster0 citations
The Limits of Morality in Strategic Games
Abstract
An agent, or a coalition of agents, is blameable for an outcome if she had a strategy to prevent it. In this paper we introduce a notion of limited blameworthiness, with a constraint on the amount of sacrifice required to prevent the outcome. The main technical contribution is a sound and complete logical system for reasoning about limited blameworthiness in the strategic game setting.
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Reasoning about actions
BibTeX
@inproceedings{ijcai2022p355,
title = {The Limits of Morality in Strategic Games},
author = {Cao, Rui and Naumov, Pavel},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-22}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization},
editor = {Lud De Raedt},
pages = {2561--2567},
year = {2022},
month = {7},
note = {Main Track},
doi = {10.24963/ijcai.2022/355},
url = {https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/355},
}