Discrete Two Player All-Pay Auction with Complete Information

Marcin Dziubiński; Krzysztof Jahn

IJCAI 2023poster1 citations

Discrete Two Player All-Pay Auction with Complete Information

Abstract

We study discrete two player all-pay auction with complete information. We provide full characterization of mixed strategy Nash equilibria and show that they constitute a subset of Nash equilibria of discrete General Lotto game. We show that equilibria are not unique in general but they are interchangeable and sets of equilibrium strategies are convex. We also show that equilibrium payoffs are unique, unless valuation of at least one of the players is an even integer number. If equilibrium payoffs are not unique, continuum of equilibrium payoffs are possible.

Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Auctions and market-based systemsGame Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Noncooperative games

BibTeX

@inproceedings{ijcai2023p296,
  title     = {Discrete Two Player All-Pay Auction with Complete Information},
  author    = {Dziubiński, Marcin and Jahn, Krzysztof},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on
               Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-23}},
  publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization},
  editor    = {Edith Elkind},
  pages     = {2659--2666},
  year      = {2023},
  month     = {8},
  note      = {Main Track},
  doi       = {10.24963/ijcai.2023/296},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2023/296},
}