Strategic Aspects of Stable Matching Markets: A Survey

Hadi Hosseini; Shraddha Pathak

IJCAI 2024poster2 citations

Strategic Aspects of Stable Matching Markets: A Survey

Abstract

Matching markets consist of two disjoint sets of agents, where each agent has a preference list over agents on the other side. The primary objective is to find a stable matching between the agents such that no unmatched pair of agents prefer each other to their matched partners. The incompatibility between stability and strategy-proofness in this domain gives rise to a variety of strategic behavior of agents, which in turn may influence the resulting matching. In this paper, we discuss fundamental properties of stable matchings, review essential structural observations, survey key results in manipulation algorithms and their game-theoretical aspects, and more importantly, highlight a series of open research questions.

Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Computational social choiceAgent-based and Multi-agent Systems: MAS: Resource allocationGame Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Auctions and market-based systemsGame Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Other

BibTeX

@inproceedings{ijcai2024p893,
  title     = {Strategic Aspects of Stable Matching Markets: A Survey},
  author    = {Hosseini, Hadi and Pathak, Shraddha},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on
               Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-24}},
  publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization},
  editor    = {Kate Larson},
  pages     = {8077--8085},
  year      = {2024},
  month     = {8},
  note      = {Survey Track},
  doi       = {10.24963/ijcai.2024/893},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2024/893},
}