IJCAI 20260 citations
A Truthful Multiunit Profit-Optimal Mechanism for Synthesizing Social Laws
Jun Wu, Jian Huang, Chongjun Wang
Abstract
Social Law Synthesis (SLS) in strategic environments is a novel multi-unit mechanism design problem, spanning modeling to computational challenges. We derive a method to specify the problem succinctly, reduce payment determination to allocation determination, and design an integer linear programming (ILP)-based algorithm that further reduces allocation to a polynomial-time ILP formulation. This offloads intractability to powerful ILP solvers, yielding a truthful, individually rational, and profit-optimal mechanism.
Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: Auctions and market-based systemsGame Theory and Economic Paradigms: Mechanism design
BibTeX
@inproceedings{ijcai2026_atruthfulmultiun,
title = {A Truthful Multiunit Profit-Optimal Mechanism for Synthesizing Social Laws},
author = {Jun Wu and Jian Huang and Chongjun Wang},
booktitle = {IJCAI 2026},
year = {2026}
}