Moral Responsibility for AI Systems
Abstract
As more and more decisions that have a significant ethical dimension are being outsourced to AI systems, it is important to have a definition of _moral responsibility_ that can be applied to AI systems. Moral responsibility for an outcome of an agent who performs some action is commonly taken to involve both a _causal condition_ and an _epistemic condition_: the action should cause the outcome, and the agent should have been aware - in some form or other - of the possible moral consequences of their action. This paper presents a formal definition of both conditions within the framework of causal models. I compare my approach to the existing approaches of Braham and van Hees (BvH) and of Halpern and Kleiman-Weiner (HK). I then generalize my definition into a _degree of responsibility_.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{
beckers2023moral,
title={Moral Responsibility for {AI} Systems},
author={Sander Beckers},
booktitle={Thirty-seventh Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems},
year={2023},
url={https://openreview.net/forum?id=jYIknUIgkd}
}