Selling Data at an Auction under Privacy Constraints
Mengxiao Zhang, Fernando Beltran, Jiamou Liu
Abstract
Private data query combines mechanism design with privacy protection to produce aggregated statistics from privately-owned data records. The problem arises in a data marketplace where data owners have personalised privacy requirements and private data valuations. We focus on the case when the data owners are single-minded, i.e., they are willing to release their data only if the data broker guarantees to meet their announced privacy requirements. For a data broker who wants to purchase data from such data owners, we propose the SingleMindedQuery (SMQ) mechanism, which uses a reverse auction to select data owners and determine compensations. SMQ satisfies interim incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget feasibility. Moreover, it uses purchased privacy expectation maximisation as a principle to produce accurate outputs for commonly-used queries such as counting, median and linear predictor. The effectiveness of our method is empirically validated by a series of experiments.
BibTeX
@InProceedings{pmlr-v124-zhang20b,
title = {Selling Data at an Auction under Privacy Constraints},
author = {Zhang, Mengxiao and Beltran, Fernando and Liu, Jiamou},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 36th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI)},
pages = {669--678},
year = {2020},
editor = {Peters, Jonas and Sontag, David},
volume = {124},
series = {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research},
month = {03--06 Aug},
publisher = {PMLR},
pdf = {http://proceedings.mlr.press/v124/zhang20b/zhang20b.pdf},
url = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v124/zhang20b.html},
abstract = {Private data query combines mechanism design with privacy protection to produce aggregated statistics from privately-owned data records. The problem arises in a data marketplace where data owners have personalised privacy requirements and private data valuations. We focus on the case when the data owners are single-minded, i.e., they are willing to release their data only if the data broker guarantees to meet their announced privacy requirements. For a data broker who wants to purchase data from such data owners, we propose the SingleMindedQuery (SMQ) mechanism, which uses a reverse auction to select data owners and determine compensations. SMQ satisfies interim incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget feasibility. Moreover, it uses purchased privacy expectation maximisation as a principle to produce accurate outputs for commonly-used queries such as counting, median and linear predictor. The effectiveness of our method is empirically validated by a series of experiments. }
}