Two-phase Attacks in Security Games
Andrzej Nagorko, Pawel Ciosmak, Tomasz Michalak
Abstract
A standard model of a security game assumes a one-off assault during which the attacker cannot update their strategy even if new actionable insights are gained in the process. In this paper, we propose a version of a security game that takes into account a possibility of a two-phase attack. Specifically, in the first phase, the attacker makes a preliminary move to gain extra information about this particular instance of the game. Based on this information, the attacker chooses an optimal concluding move. We derive a compact-form mixed-integer linear program that computes an optimal strategy of the defender. Our simulation shows that this strategy mitigates serious losses incurred to the defender by a two-phase attack while still protecting well against less sophisticated attackers.
BibTeX
@InProceedings{pmlr-v216-nagorko23a,
title = {Two-phase Attacks in Security Games},
author = {Nagorko, Andrzej and Ciosmak, Pawel and Michalak, Tomasz},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence},
pages = {1489--1498},
year = {2023},
editor = {Evans, Robin J. and Shpitser, Ilya},
volume = {216},
series = {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research},
month = {31 Jul--04 Aug},
publisher = {PMLR},
pdf = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v216/nagorko23a/nagorko23a.pdf},
url = {https://proceedings.mlr.press/v216/nagorko23a.html},
abstract = {A standard model of a security game assumes a one-off assault during which the attacker cannot update their strategy even if new actionable insights are gained in the process. In this paper, we propose a version of a security game that takes into account a possibility of a two-phase attack. Specifically, in the first phase, the attacker makes a preliminary move to gain extra information about this particular instance of the game. Based on this information, the attacker chooses an optimal concluding move. We derive a compact-form mixed-integer linear program that computes an optimal strategy of the defender. Our simulation shows that this strategy mitigates serious losses incurred to the defender by a two-phase attack while still protecting well against less sophisticated attackers.}
}