Élie de Panafieu

2 accepted papers

2026

Super Condorcet Winners and Limit Coalitional Manipulability of IRV

Élie de Panafieu, François Durand, Guillem Perarnau

IJCAI 2026

We study the limit CM rate of single-winner voting rules under Impartial Culture, defined as the probability that a preference profile is coalitionally manipulable in the limit of large electorates. For three candidates, Lepelley and Valognes [1999] derived a closed-form expression for Plurality wit

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2026

The Communication Complexity of Instant-Runoff Voting

Élie de Panafieu, François Durand, Jérôme Lang

IJCAI 2026

The communication complexity of a voting rule is the worst-case number of bits that n voters must transmit to a central authority under the most efficient elicitation protocol in an election with m candidates. We study the communication complexity of Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV). Conitzer and Sandhol

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