10 accepted papers
In this paper, we study a generalization of Markov games and pseudo-games that we call Markov pseudo-games, which like the former, captures time and uncertainty, and like the latter, allows for the players’ actions to determine the set of actions available to the other players. In the same vein as A…
We investigate why deep neural networks suffer from loss of plasticity in deep continual learning, failing to learn new tasks without reinitializing parameters. We show that this failure is preceded by Hessian spectral collapse at new-task initialization, where meaningful curvature directions vanish…
In off-policy policy evaluation (OPE) tasks within reinforcement learning, Temporal Difference Learning(TD) and Fitted Q-Iteration (FQI) have traditionally been viewed as differing in the number of updates toward the target value function: TD makes one update, FQI makes an infinite number, and Parti…
In this paper, we study inverse game theory (resp. inverse multiagent learning) in which the goal is to find parameters of a game’s payoff functions for which the expected (resp. sampled) behavior is an equilibrium. We formulate these problems as generative-adversarial (i.e., min-max) optimization p…
Zero-sum Markov Stackelberg games can be used to model myriad problems, in domains ranging from economics to human robot interaction. In this paper, we develop policy gradient methods that solve these games in continuous state and action settings using noisy gradient estimates computed from observed…
A Fisher market is an economic model of buyer and seller interactions in which each buyer’s utility depends only on the bundle of goods she obtains. Many people’s interests, however, are affected by their social interactions with others. In this paper, we introduce a generalization of Fisher markets…
Pseudo-games are a natural and well-known generalization of normal-form games, in which the actions taken by each player affect not only the other players' payoffs, as in games, but also the other players' strategy sets. The solution concept par excellence for pseudo-games is the generalized Nash eq…
Zero-sum stochastic games have found important applications in a variety of fields, from machine learning to economics. Work on this model has primarily focused on the computation of Nash equilibrium due to its effectiveness in solving adversarial board and video games. Unfortunately, a Nash equilib…
Min-max optimization problems (i.e., min-max games) have been attracting a great deal of attention because of their applicability to a wide range of machine learning problems. Although significant progress has been made recently, the literature to date has focused on games with independent strategy…
We introduce a methodology for the design of parametric mechanisms, which are multiagent systems inhabited by strategic agents, with knobs that can be adjusted to achieve specific goals. We assume agents play approximate equilibria, which we estimate using the probably approximately correct learning…