9 accepted papers
We study equilibrium pricing in oligopolistic data markets with budget-constrained buyers (e.g., ML companies purchasing data to improve model accuracy) and strategic data sellers. Sellers compete by setting prices for their datasets, giving rise to a pricing game whose pure Nash equilibria correspo…
The rapid growth of data-driven technologies and the emergence of various data-sharing paradigms have underscored the need for efficient and stable data exchange protocols. In any such exchange, agents must carefully balance the benefit of acquiring valuable data against the cost of sharing their ow…
Federated learning (FL) is a popular collaborative learning paradigm, whereby agents with individual datasets can jointly train an ML model. While higher data sharing improves model accuracy and leads to higher payoffs, it also raises costs associated with data acquisition or loss of privacy, causi…
Previous work on fairness in federated learning introduced the notion of *core stability*, which provides utility-based fairness guarantees to any subset of participating agents. However, these guarantees require strong assumptions on agent utilities that render them impractical. To address this sho…
We study fair division of indivisible chores among n agents with additive disutility functions. Two well-studied fairness notions for indivisible items are envy-freeness up to one/any item (EF1/EFX) and the standard notion of economic efficiency is Pareto optimality (PO). There is a noticeable gap b…
Federated learning (FL) has emerged as a powerful scheme to facilitate the collaborative learning of models amongst a set of agents holding their own private data. Although the agents benefit from the global model trained on shared data, by participating in federated learning, they may also incur c…
Federated learning provides an effective paradigm to jointly optimize a model benefited from rich distributed data while protecting data privacy. Nonetheless, the heterogeneity nature of distributed data, especially in the non-IID setting, makes it challenging to define and ensure fairness among loc…
We consider the problem of maximizing the Nash social welfare when allocating a set G of indivisible goods to a set N of agents. We study instances, in which all agents have 2-value additive valuations: The value of every agent for every good is either p or q, where p and q are integers and p2. I…
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with subadditive valuations in a fair and efficient manner. Envy-Freeness up to any good (EFX) is the most compelling notion of fairness in the context of indivisible goods. Although the existence of EFX is not known beyond t…