2026
Fair Diffusion Auctions
AAAI 2026technical
Diffusion auction design is a new trend in mechanism design which extends the original incentive compatibility property to include buyers
11 accepted papers
Diffusion auction design is a new trend in mechanism design which extends the original incentive compatibility property to include buyers
Incentives for early arrival (I4EA) was recently proposed for studying online cooperative games. In an online cooperative game, players arrive in an unknown order, and the value increase after each player arrived should be distributed immediately among all the arrived players. Although there is only
The diffusion auction is an emerging auction model which leverages social networks to recruit more buyers, thereby improving auction revenue and allocation efficiency. Previous studies on diffusion auctions have primarily focused on the single-parameter domain, where each buyer's valuation function
Incentives for Early Arrival (I4EA) is a novel concept for online cooperative games introduced in an award-winning paper by Ge et al. (2024). The aim of I4EA is to encourage players to join a collaboration as soon as they become aware of it, a new study with significant real-world applications, incl…
We study cooperative games where players join sequentially, and the value generated by those who have joined at any point must be irrevocably divided among these players. We introduce two desiderata for the value division mechanism: that the players should have incentives to join as early as possibl
Mechanism design on social networks has attracted extensive attention recently. The goal is to design mechanisms to incentivize participants to invite more participants via their social networks, and the challenge is that the participants are competitors. Various mechanisms have been proposed for si…
Selecting influentials in networks against strategic manipulations has attracted many researchers' attention and it also has many practical applications. Here, we aim to select one or two influentials in terms of progeny (the influential power) and prevent agents from manipulating their edges (incen…
We study a single task allocation problem where each worker connects to some other workers to form a network and the task requester only connects to some of the workers. The goal is to design an allocation mechanism such that each worker is incentivized to invite her neighbours to join the allocatio…
Mechanism design has traditionally assumed that the participants are fixed and independent. However, in reality, the participants are well-connected (e.g., via their social networks) and we can utilize their connections to power the design. One interesting trend is to incentivize the existing partic…
Diffusion auction is a new model in auction design. It can incentivize the buyers who have already joined in the auction to further diffuse the sale information to others via social relations, whereby both the seller's revenue and the social welfare can be improved. Diffusion auctions are essentiall…
We study a question answering problem on a social network, where a requester is seeking an answer from the agents on the network. The goal is to design reward mechanisms to incentivize the agents to propagate the requester's query to their neighbours if they don't have the answer. Existing mechanism…