Fatima Umar

2 accepted papers

2022

Two for One & One for All: Two-Sided Manipulation in Matching Markets

IJCAI 2022poster

Strategic behavior in two-sided matching markets has been traditionally studied in a "one-sided" manipulation setting where the agent who misreports is also the intended beneficiary. Our work investigates "two-sided" manipulation of the deferred acceptance algorithm where the misreporting agent and…

Cited by 7 Source ↗PDF ↗Scholar ↗

2021

Accomplice Manipulation of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm

Hadi Hosseini, Fatima Umar, Rohit Vaish

IJCAI 2021poster

The deferred acceptance algorithm is an elegant solution to the stable matching problem that guarantees optimality and truthfulness for one side of the market. Despite these desirable guarantees, it is susceptible to strategic misreporting of preferences by the agents on the other side. We study a n…

Cited by 12 Source ↗PDF ↗Scholar ↗