4 accepted papers
We study the problem of (approximate) maximin share (MMS) allocation of indivisible items among a set of agents. We focus on the graphical valuation model, in which the input is given by a graph where edges correspond to items, and vertices correspond to agents. An edge may have non-zero marginal
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items among a set of agents. We consider the notion of (approximate) maximin share (MMS) and we provide an improved lower bound of 1/2 (which is tight) for the case of subadditive valuations when the number of agents is at most four. We
Our work revisits the design of mechanisms via the learning-augmented framework. In this model, the algorithm is enhanced with imperfect (machine-learned) information concerning the input, usually referred to as prediction. The goal is to design algorithms whose performance degrades gently as a func…
We study a participatory budgeting problem, where a set of strategic agents wish to split a divisible budget among different projects by aggregating their proposals on a single division. Unfortunately, the straightforward rule that divides the budget proportionally is susceptible to manipulation. Re…