29 accepted papers
Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has evolved to be one of the main methods for fine-tuning large language models (LLMs). However, existing RLHF methods are non-robust, and their performance deteriorates if the downstream task differs significantly from the preference dataset used in…
LLM-based multi-agent systems have demonstrated impressive capabilities, but they also introduce significant safety risks when individual agents fail or behave adversarially. In this work, we study the automated design of agentic systems that remain safe even when a subset of agents is compromised. …
We study the corruption-robustness of in-context reinforcement learning (ICRL), focusing on the Decision-Pretrained Transformer (DPT, Lee et al., 2023). To address the challenge of reward poisoning attacks targeting the DPT, we propose a novel adversarial training framework, called Adversarially Tra…
We study data corruption robustness for reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF) in an offline setting. Given an offline dataset of pairs of trajectories along with feedback about human preferences, an $\varepsilon$-fraction of the pairs is corrupted (e.g., feedback flipped or trajectory f…
We address the challenge of explaining counterfactual outcomes in multi-agent Markov decision processes. In particular, we aim to explain the total counterfactual effect of an agent's action on the outcome of a realized scenario through its influence on the environment dynamics and the agents' behav…
Performative Reinforcement Learning (PRL) refers to a scenario in which the deployed policy changes the reward and transition dynamics of the underlying environment. In this work, we study multi-agent PRL by incorporating performative effects into Markov Potential Games (MPGs). We introduce the not…
In performative Reinforcement Learning (RL), an agent faces a policy-dependent environment: the reward and transition functions depend on the agent's policy. Prior work on performative RL has studied the convergence of repeated retraining approaches to a performatively stable policy. In the finite s…
We study the setting of \emph{performative reinforcement learning} where the deployed policy affects both the reward, and the transition of the underlying Markov decision process. Prior work (Mandal et al., 2023) has addressed this problem under the tabular setting and established last-iterate conv…
We study data poisoning attacks in learning from human preferences. More specifically, we consider the problem of teaching/enforcing a target policy $\pi^\dagger$ by synthesizing preference data. We seek to understand the susceptibility of different preference-based learning paradigms to poisoned pr…
We study a stochastic principal-agent model. A principal and an agent interact in a stochastic environment, each privy to observations about the state not available to the other. The principal has the power of commitment, both to elicit information from the agent and to signal her own information. T…
Recent work has proposed automated red-teaming methods for testing the vulnerabilities of a given target large language model (LLM). These methods use red-teaming LLMs to uncover inputs that induce harmful behavior in a target LLM. In this paper, we study red-teaming strategies that enable a targe…
Establishing causal relationships between actions and outcomes is fundamental for accountable multi-agent decision-making. However, interpreting and quantifying agents' contributions to such relationships pose significant challenges. These challenges are particularly prominent in the context of mult…
We study data corruption robustness in offline two-player zero-sum Markov games. Given a dataset of realized trajectories of two players, an adversary is allowed to modify an $\epsilon$-fraction of it. The learner’s goal is to identify an approximate Nash Equilibrium policy pair from the corrupted d…
We present an information-theoretic framework to learn fixed-dimensional embeddings for tasks in reinforcement learning. We leverage the idea that two tasks are similar if observing an agent's performance on one task reduces our uncertainty about its performance on the other. This intuition is captu…
When Reinforcement Learning (RL) agents are deployed in practice, they might impact their environment and change its dynamics. We propose a new framework to model this phenomenon, where the current environment depends on the deployed policy as well as its previous dynamics. This is a generalization…
Equipping agents with the capacity to justify made decisions using supporting evidence represents a cornerstone of accountable decision-making. Furthermore, ensuring that justifications are in line with human expectations and societal norms is vital, especially in high-stakes situations such as heal…
In this paper, we take a step towards a deeper understanding of learning from human preferences by systematically comparing the paradigm of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) with the recently proposed paradigm of direct preference optimization (DPO). We focus our attention on the cla…
Canonical models of Markov decision processes (MDPs) usually consider geometric discounting based on a constant discount factor. While this standard modeling approach has led to many elegant results, some recent studies indicate the necessity of modeling time-varying discounting in certain applicati…
We consider the problem of defense against reward-poisoning attacks in reinforcement learning and formulate it as a game in $T$ rounds between a defender and an adaptive attacker in an adversarial environment. To address this problem, we design two novel defense algorithms. First, we propose Exp3-DA…
Existing episodic reinforcement algorithms assume that the length of an episode is fixed across time and known a priori. In this paper, we consider a general framework of episodic reinforcement learning when the length of each episode is drawn from a distribution. We first establish that this prob…
We introduce the framework of performative reinforcement learning where the policy chosen by the learner affects the underlying reward and transition dynamics of the environment. Following the recent literature on performative prediction (Perdomo et al., 2020), we introduce the concept of performati…
We study reward design strategies for incentivizing a reinforcement learning agent to adopt a policy from a set of admissible policies. The goal of the reward designer is to modify the underlying reward function cost-efficiently while ensuring that any approximately optimal deterministic policy unde…
We study a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in sequential decision-making settings. An informed principal observes an external parameter of the world and advises an uninformed agent about actions to take over time. The agent takes actions in each time step based on the current state, the princip…
We study envy-free policy teaching. A number of agents independently explore a common Markov decision process (MDP), but each with their own reward function and discounting rate. A teacher wants to teach a target policy to this diverse group of agents, by means of modifying the agents' reward functi…
We study the design of explicable reward functions for a reinforcement learning agent while guaranteeing that an optimal policy induced by the function belongs to a set of target policies. By being explicable, we seek to capture two properties: (a) informativeness so that the rewards speed up the ag…
Blame attribution is one of the key aspects of accountable decision making, as it provides means to quantify the responsibility of an agent for a decision making outcome. In this paper, we study blame attribution in the context of cooperative multi-agent sequential decision making. As a particular s…
We study a security threat to reinforcement learning where an attacker poisons the learning environment to force the agent into executing a target policy chosen by the attacker. As a victim, we consider RL agents whose objective is to find a policy that maximizes average reward in undiscounted infin…
We consider a two-agent MDP framework where agents repeatedly solve a task in a collaborative setting. We study the problem of designing a learning algorithm for the first agent (A1) that facilitates a successful collaboration even in cases when the second agent (A2) is adapting its policy in an unk…
We consider a two-player sequential game in which agents have the same reward function but may disagree on the transition probabilities of an underlying Markovian model of the world. By committing to play a specific policy, the agent with the correct model can steer the behavior of the other agent,…