Guido Schäfer — accepted AI-conference papers

2026

Beyond Stability: Improved Efficiency Guarantees for α-Stable Matchings

Isabel Fernandez Abad, Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer

IJCAI 2026

Stable matching mechanisms are fundamental to market design but face an inherent tension between stability and social welfare optimality. We study a natural relaxation of stability, termed α-stability, which models agents as willing to deviate only when the potential improvement is sufficiently larg

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2026

Breaking Barriers, Finding Boundaries: Not Obviously Manipulable Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design

Bart de Keijzer, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis, Carmine Ventre

AAAI 2026technical

Strategyproofness has been the holy grail in mechanism design for decades, providing strong incentive compatibility guarantees under the assumption of perfectly rational agents. However, this assumption is questionable when agents exhibit bounded rationality. Moreover, strategyproofness often impose

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