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Jiehua Chen

10 accepted papers

2026

How Hard Is It to Explain Preferences Using Few Boolean Attributes?

AAAI 2026technical

We study the computational complexity of explaining preference data through Boolean attribute models (BAMs), motivated by extensive research involving attribute models and their promise in understanding preference structure and enabling more efficient decision-making processes. In a BAM, each alte

Cited by 0SourcePDFScholar
2025

Assignments for Congestion-Averse Agents: Seeking Competitive and Envy-Free Solutions

NeurIPS 2025poster

We investigate congested assignment problems where agents have preferences over both resources and their associated congestion levels. These agents are \emph{averse} towards congestion, i.e., consistently preferring lower congestion for identical resources. Such scenarios are ubiquitous across domai…

Cited by 0SourceScholar
2025

Control in Computational Social Choice

IJCAI 2025

We survey the notion of control in various areas of computational social choice (COMSOC) such as voting, fair allocation, cooperative game theory, matching under preferences, and group identification. In all these scenarios, control can be exerted, for instance, by adding or deleting agents with the

Cited by 0SourcePDFScholar
2025

Multi-Organizational Scheduling: Individual Rationality, Optimality, and Complexity

IJCAI 2025

We investigate multi-organizational scheduling problems, building upon the framework introduced by Pascual et al. in 2009. In this setting, multiple organizations each own a set of identical machines and sequential jobs with distinct processing times. The challenge lies in optimally assigning jobs a

Cited by 0SourcePDFScholar
2023

Game Implementation: What Are the Obstructions?

AAAI 2023technical

In many applications, we want to influence the decisions of independent agents by designing incentives for their actions. We revisit a fundamental problem in this area, called GAME IMPLEMENTATION: Given a game in standard form and a set of desired strategies, can we design a set of payment promises…

Cited by 0SourcePDFScholar
2020

Stable Matchings with Diversity Constraints: Affirmative Action is beyond NP

IJCAI 2020poster

We investigate the following many-to-one stable matching problem with diversity constraints (SMTI-DIVERSE): Given a set of students and a set of colleges which have preferences over each other, where the students have overlapping types, and the colleges each have a total capacity as well as quotas f…

Cited by 0SourcePDFScholar