19 accepted papers
This paper proposes an asymmetric perturbation technique for solving bilinear saddle-point optimization problems, commonly arising in minimax problems, game theory, and constrained optimization. Perturbing payoffs or values is known to be effective in stabilizing learning dynamics and equilibrium co…
We study last-iterate convergence for stochastic smooth and monotone variational inequalities (VIs), a framework that captures convex-concave saddle points and Nash equilibrium computation in monotone games with noisy payoff feedback. In contrast to the well-understood average-iterate guarantees, an…
Traditional approaches in offline reinforcement learning aim to learn the optimal policy that maximizes the cumulative reward, also known as return. It is increasingly important to adjust the performance of AI agents to meet human requirements, for example, in applications like video games and educa…
This paper introduces state abstraction for two-player zero-sum Markov games (TZMGs) where the payoffs for the two players are determined by the state representing the environment and their respective actions, with state transitions following a Markov decision processes. For example, in games like s…
This paper presents a payoff perturbation technique, introducing a strong convexity to players' payoff functions in games. This technique is specifically designed for first-order methods to achieve last-iterate convergence in games where the gradient of the payoff functions is monotone in the strate…
In the Lasry--Lions framework, Mean-Field Games (MFGs) model interactions among an infinite number of agents. However, existing algorithms either require strict monotonicity or only guarantee the convergence of averaged iterates, as in Fictitious Play in continuous time. We address this gap with the…
This study raises and addresses the problem of time-delayed feedback in learning in games. Because learning in games assumes that multiple agents independently learn their strategies, a discrepancy in optimization often emerges among the agents. To overcome this discrepancy, the prediction of the fu…
Best-of-N (BoN) sampling with a reward model has been shown to be an effective strategy for aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) to human preferences at the time of decoding. BoN sampling is susceptible to a problem known as reward hacking when the accuracy of the reward model is not high enough. B…
Learning in zero-sum games studies a situation where multiple agents competitively learn their strategy. In such multi-agent learning, we often see that the strategies cycle around their optimum, i.e., Nash equilibrium. When a game periodically varies (called a ``periodic'' game), however, the Nash…
This paper proposes a payoff perturbation technique for the Mirror Descent (MD) algorithm in games where the gradient of the payoff functions is monotone in the strategy profile space, potentially containing additive noise. The optimistic family of learning algorithms, exemplified by optimistic MD,…
Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) plays a crucial role in aligning language models with human preferences. While the significance of dataset quality is generally recognized, explicit investigations into its impact within the RLHF framework, to our knowledge, have been limited. This p…
This work addresses learning online fair division under uncertainty, where a central planner sequentially allocates items without precise knowledge of agents’ values or utilities. Departing from conventional online algorithms, the planner here relies on noisy, estimated values obtained after allocat…
Learning in games considers how multiple agents maximize their own rewards through repeated games. Memory, an ability that an agent changes his/her action depending on the history of actions in previous games, is often introduced into learning to explore more clever strategies and discuss the decisi…
Minimum Bayes Risk (MBR) decoding has been shown to be a powerful alternative to beam search decoding in a variety of text generation tasks. MBR decoding selects a hypothesis from a pool of hypotheses that has the least expected risk under a probability model according to a given utility function. S…
This paper proposes Mutation-Driven Multiplicative Weights Update (M2WU) for learning an equilibrium in two-player zero-sum normal-form games and proves that it exhibits the last-iterate convergence property in both full and noisy feedback settings. In the former, players observe their exact gradien…
Repeated games consider a situation where multiple agents are motivated by their independent rewards throughout learning. In general, the dynamics of their learning become complex. Especially when their rewards compete with each other like zero-sum games, the dynamics often do not converge to their…
This paper considers the capacity expansion problem in two-sided matchings, where the policymaker is allowed to allocate some extra seats as well as the standard seats. In medical residency match, each hospital accepts a limited number of doctors. Such capacity constraints are typically given in adv…
In this study, we consider a variant of the Follow the Regularized Leader (FTRL) dynamics in two-player zero-sum games. FTRL is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium when time-averaging the strategies, while a lot of variants suffer from the issue of limit cycling behavior, i.e., lack the las…
In this paper, we revisit the regret minimization problem in sparse stochastic contextual linear bandits, where feature vectors may be of large dimension $d$, but where the reward function depends on a few, say $s_0\ll d$, of these features only. We present Thresholded Lasso bandit, an algorithm tha…