Kiriaki Fragkia

2 accepted papers

2026

Learning in Structured Stackelberg Games

Nina Balcan, Kiriaki Fragkia, Keegan Harris

ICML 2026spotlight

We initiate the study of structured Stackelberg games, a novel form of strategic interaction between a leader and a follower where contextual information can be predictive of the follower's (unknown) type. Motivated by applications such as security games and AI safety, we show how this additional st…

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2025

Beyond Symmetry in Repeated Games with Restarts

Henry Fleischmann, Kiriaki Fragkia, Ratip Emin Berker

IJCAI 2025

Infinitely repeated games support equilibrium concepts beyond those present in one-shot games (e.g., cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma). Nonetheless, repeated games fail to capture our real-world intuition for settings with many anonymous agents interacting in pairs. Repeated games with restarts

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