5 accepted papers
In this paper, we consider the problem of fair division of indivisible goods, where the allocation of goods impacts society. Specifically, we introduce a second valuation function for each agent, which determines the social impact of allocating a good to the agent. Such impact is considered desirabl…
Hedonic Games (HGs) are a classical framework modeling coalition formation of strategic agents guided by their individual preferences. According to these preferences, it is desirable that a coalition structure (i.e. a partition of agents into coalitions) satisfies some form of stability. The most w…
We study PAC learnability and PAC stabilizability of Hedonic Games (HGs), i.e., efficiently inferring preferences or core-stable partitions from samples. We first expand the known learnability/stabilizability landscape for some of the most prominent HGs classes, providing results for Friends and Ene…
We investigate strategyproof mechanisms in the Group Activity Selection Problem with the additively separable property. Namely, agents have distinct preferences for each activity and individual weights for the other agents. We evaluate our mechanisms in terms of their approximation ratio with respec…
In polymatrix coordination games, each player x is a node of a graph and must select an action in her strategy set. Nodes are playing separate bimatrix games with their neighbors in the graph. Namely, the utility of x is given by the preference she has for her action plus, for each neighbor y, a pay…