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Neeldhara Misra

2 accepted papers

2026

The Cost and Complexity of Minimizing Envy in House Allocations (Abstract Reprint)

AAAI 2026technical

We study almost envy-freeness in house allocation, where m houses are to be allocated among n agents so that every agent receives exactly one house. An envy-free allocation need not exist, and therefore we may have to settle for relaxations. We study different aggregate measures of envy as markers o

Cited by 0SourcePDFScholar
2020

On the Complexity of Winner Verification and Candidate Winner for Multiwinner Voting Rules

IJCAI 2020poster

The Chamberlin-Courant and Monroe rules are fundamental and well-studied rules in the literature of multi-winner elections. The problem of determining if there exists a committee of size k that has a Chamberlin-Courant (respectively, Monroe) dissatisfaction score of at most r is known to be NP-compl…

Cited by 0SourcePDFScholar