4 accepted papers
We develop a model of content filtering as a game between the filter and the content consumer, where the latter incurs information costs for examining the content. Motivating examples include censoring misinformation, spam/phish filtering, and recommender systems acting on a stream of content. When…
When deployed in the world, a learning agent such as a recommender system or a chatbot often repeatedly interacts with another learning agent (such as a user) over time. In many such two-agent systems, each agent learns separately and the rewards of the two agents are not perfectly aligned. To bette…
Motivated by applications such as college admission and insurance rate determination, we study a classification problem where the inputs are controlled by strategic individuals who can modify their features at a cost. A learner can only partially observe the features, and aims to classify individua…
We consider the canonical problem of influence maximization in social networks. Since the seminal work of Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos there have been two, largely disjoint efforts on this problem. The first studies the problem associated with learning the generative model that produces cascades, an…