8 accepted papers
We study strategic candidate nomination by parties in elections decided by Plurality voting. Each party selects a nominee before the election, and the winner is chosen from the nominated candidates based on the voters
Cooperation among independent learning agents is desirable as it enables reaching collectively rewarding states. Recent work has shown that artificial agents can learn to act pro-socially without the need for predefined cooperative preferences or behavioural heuristics, provided that they can observ
Social dilemmas are an important benchmark to study the emergence of cooperation among autonomous learning agents and impressive results were recently achieved in two-player games by reinforcement learning agents equipped with a partner selection module. However, the same cannot be said for games on
If given the choice, what strategy should agents use to switch partners in strategic social interactions? While many analyses have been performed on specific switching heuristics, showing how and when these lead to more cooperation, no insights have been provided into which rule will actually be le…
Majority illusion occurs in a social network when the majority of the network vertices belong to a certain type but the majority of each vertex's neighbours belong to a different type, therefore creating the wrong perception, i.e., the illusion, that the majority type is different from the actual on…
The Model AI Assignments session seeks to gather and disseminate the best assignment designs of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Education community. Recognizing that assignments form the core of student learning experience, we here present abstracts of six AI assignments from the 2023 session that…
Structural causal models provide a formalism to express causal relations between variables of interest. Models and variables can represent a system at different levels of abstraction, whereby relations may be coarsened and refined according to the need of a modeller. However, switching between diff…
In peer selection agents must choose a subset of themselves for an award or a prize. As agents are self-interested, we want to design algorithms that are impartial, so that an individual agent cannot affect their own chance of being selected. This problem has broad application in resource allocation…