8 accepted papers
In approval-based budget division, the task is to allocate a divisible resource to the candidates based on the voters' approval preferences over the candidates. For this setting, Brandl et al. (2021) have shown that no distribution rule can be strategyproof, efficient, and fair at the same time. In
We introduce and analyze distance preservation games (DPGs). In DPGs, agents express ideal distances to other agents and need to choose locations in the unit interval while preserving their ideal distances as closely as possible. We analyze the existence and computation of location profiles that are
An important - but very demanding - property in collective decision-making is strategyproofness, which requires that voters cannot benefit from submitting insincere preferences. Gibbard (1977) has shown that only rather unattractive rules are strategyproof, even when allowing for randomization. Howe…
In approval-based committee (ABC) voting, the goal is to choose a subset of predefined size of the candidates based on the voters’ approval preferences over the candidates. While this problem has attracted significant attention in recent years, the incentives for voters to participate in an election…
In approval-based committee (ABC) elections, the goal is to select a fixed-size subset of the candidates, a so-called committee, based on the voters' approval ballots over the candidates. One of the most popular classes of ABC voting rules are ABC scoring rules, for which voters give points to each…
In party-approval multiwinner elections the goal is to allocate the seats of a fixed-size committee to parties based on the approval ballots of the voters over the parties. In particular, each voter can approve multiple parties and each party can be assigned multiple seats. Two central requirements…
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the preferences of individual voters over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. In order to study properties such as efficiency, strategyproofness, and participation for SDSs, preferences over alternatives are typically lifted t…
When aggregating preferences of multiple agents, strategyproofness is a fundamental requirement. For randomized voting rules, so-called social decision schemes (SDSs), strategyproofness is usually formalized with the help of utility functions. A classic result shown by Gibbard in 1977 characterizes…