4 accepted papers
A new paradigm of mechanism design, called mechanism design over social networks, investigates agents’ incentives to diffuse the information of mechanisms to their followers over social networks. In this paper we consider it for two-sided matching, where the agents on one side, say students, are dis…
We study the pairwise organ exchange problem among groups motivated by real-world applications and consider two types of group formulations. Each group represents either a certain type of patient-donor pairs who are compatible with the same set of organs, or a set of patient-donor pairs who reside…
We study the Japanese Residency Matching Program (JRMP) in which hospitals are partitioned into disjoint regions and both hospitals and regions are subject to quotas. To achieve a balanced distribution of doctors across regions, hard bounds are imposed by the government to limit the number of docto…
My research is summarized as mechanism design with uncertainty. Traditional mechanism design focuses on static environments where all the (possibly probabilistic) information about the agents are observable by the mechanism designer. In practice, however, it is possible that the set of participating…