4 accepted papers
Fair division mechanisms for indivisible goods require agent orderings to deterministically select one allocation when running the algorithm in practice. We introduce position envy-freeness up to one good (PEF1) as a fairness criterion for mechanisms: a mechanism is said to satisfy PEF1 if for any p
Several resource allocation settings involve agents with unequal entitlements represented by weights. We analyze weighted fair division from an asymptotic perspective: if m items are divided among n agents whose utilities are independently sampled from a probability distribution, when is it likely t
We study a practical centralized matching problem which assigns children to daycare centers. The collective preferences of siblings from the same family introduce complementarities, which can lead to the absence of stable matchings, as observed in the hospital-doctor matching problems involving coup
Couples often encounter the challenge of sharing house chores. This raises the fundamental question of how to divide chores. In this paper, we present a new application for a fair division of household chores. Our platform, called Kajibuntan, allows couples to specify the set of chores to be shared…