2026
Designing Truthful Mechanisms for Asymptotic Fair Division
AAAI 2026technical
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of m goods among n agents in the asymptotic setting, where each item
3 accepted papers
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of m goods among n agents in the asymptotic setting, where each item
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items among agents whose preferences include externalities. Unlike the standard fair division model, agents may derive positive or negative utility not only from items allocated directly to them, but also from items allocated to other agents. S
We study fair mechanisms for the classic job scheduling problem on unrelated machines with the objective of minimizing the makespan. This problem is equivalent to minimizing the egalitarian social cost in the fair division of chores. The two prevalent fairness notions in the fair division literature…