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Vittorio Bilò

7 accepted papers

2026

Approximately Envy-free and Equitable Allocations of Indivisible Items for Non-monotone Valuations

AAAI 2026technical

We revisit the setting of fair allocation of indivisible items among agents with heterogeneous, non-monotone valuations. We explore the existence and efficient computation of allocations that approximately satisfy either envy-freeness or equity constraints. Approximate envy-freeness ensures that eac

Cited by 0SourcePDFScholar
2024

Enhancing the Efficiency of Altruism and Taxes in Affine Congestion Games through Signalling

AAAI 2024technical

We address the problem of improving the worst-case efficiency of pure Nash equilibria (aka, the price of anarchy) in affine congestion games, through a novel use of signalling. We assume that, for each player in the game, a most preferred strategy is publicly signalled. This can be done either distr…

Cited by 0SourcePDFScholar
2023

Schelling Games with Continuous Types

IJCAI 2023poster

In most major cities and urban areas, residents form homogeneous neighborhoods along ethnic or socioeconomic lines. This phenomenon is widely known as residential segregation and has been studied extensively. Fifty years ago, Schelling proposed a landmark model that explains residential segregation…

Cited by 6SourcePDFScholar
2022

Tolerance is Necessary for Stability: Single-Peaked Swap Schelling Games

IJCAI 2022poster

Residential segregation in metropolitan areas is a phenomenon that can be observed all over the world. Recently, this was investigated via game-theoretic models. There, selfish agents of two types are equipped with a monotone utility function that ensures higher utility if an agent has more same-typ…

Cited by 16SourcePDFScholar