6 accepted papers
Large Language Models (LLMs) can produce catastrophic responses in conversational settings that pose serious risks to public safety and security. Existing evaluations often fail to fully reveal these vulnerabilities because they rely on fixed attack prompt sequences, lack statistical guarantees, and…
We identify a fundamental tension in securing LLMs: the \textbf{security--fidelity tradeoff}. While defenses against indirect prompt injection are becoming more robust, we show that they inevitably impair the model's ability to process benign, instruction-like text. Current evaluations miss this cos…
Computer-use agents (CUAs) have made tremendous progress in the past year, yet they still frequently produce misaligned actions that deviate from the user's original intent. Such misaligned actions may arise from external attacks (e.g., indirect prompt injection) or from internal limitations (e.g., …
Current spoken language understanding systems heavily rely on the best hypothesis (ASR 1-best) generated by automatic speech recognition, which is used as the input for downstream models such as natural language understanding (NLU) modules. However, the potential errors and misrecognition in ASR 1-b…
In commercial dialogue systems, the Spoken Language Understanding (SLU) component tends to have numerous domains thus context is needed to help resolve ambiguities. Previous works that incorporate context for SLU have mostly focused on domains where context is limited to a few minutes. However, ther…
Currently, in spoken language understanding (SLU) systems, the automatic speech recognition (ASR) module produces multiple interpretations (or hypotheses) for the input audio signal and the natural language understanding (NLU) module takes the one with the highest confidence score for domain or inte…