AAAI 2026technical0 citations
Weakest Bidder Types and New Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auctions
Siddharth Prasad, Maria Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm
Abstract
Core-selecting combinatorial auctions are popular auction designs that constrain prices to eliminate the incentive for any group of bidders---with the seller---to renegotiate for a better deal. They help overcome the low-revenue issues of classical combinatorial auctions. We introduce a new class of core-selecting combinatorial auctions that leverage bidder information available to the auction designer. We model such information through constraints on the joint type space of the bidders---these are constraints on bidders
BibTeX
@inproceedings{aaai2026_weakestbiddertyp,
title = {Weakest Bidder Types and New Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auctions},
author = {Siddharth Prasad and Maria Florina Balcan and Tuomas Sandholm},
booktitle = {AAAI 2026},
year = {2026}
}