IJCAI 2020poster0 citations
Strategic Campaign Management in Apportionment Elections
Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, Michal Furdyna, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Martin Lackner
Abstract
In parliamentary elections, parties compete for a limited, typically fixed number of seats. We study the complexity of the following bribery-style problem: Given the distribution of votes among the parties, what is the smallest number of voters that need to be convinced to vote for our party, so that it gets a desired number of seats. We also run extensive experiments on real-world election data and measure the effectiveness of our method.
Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: VotingAgent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social ChoiceAgent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory
BibTeX
@inproceedings{ijcai2020p15,
title = {Strategic Campaign Management in Apportionment Elections},
author = {Bredereck, Robert and Faliszewski, Piotr and Furdyna, Michal and Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej and Lackner, Martin},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-20}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization},
editor = {Christian Bessiere},
pages = {103--109},
year = {2020},
month = {7},
note = {Main track},
doi = {10.24963/ijcai.2020/15},
url = {https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/15},
}