11 accepted papers
The fair division of indivisible goods is not only a subject of theoretical research, but also an important problem in practice, with solutions being offered on several online platforms. Little is known, however, about the characteristics of real-world allocation instances and how they compare to sy
In a recently introduced model of successive committee elections, for a given set of ordinal or approval preferences one aims to find a sequence of a given length of “best” same-size committees such that each candidate is a member of a limited number of consecutive committees. However, the practical
We study strategic behavior of project proposers in the context of approval-based participatory budgeting (PB). In our model we assume that the votes are fixed and known and the proposers want to set as high project prices as possible, provided that their projects get selected and the prices are not…
We analyze how numerical experiments regarding elections were conducted within computational social choice literature (focusing on papers published in the IJCAI, AAAI, and AAMAS conferences). We analyze the sizes of the studied elections and the methods of generating preference data, thereby making…
We study committee elections from a perspective of finding the most conflicting candidates, that is, candidates that imply the largest amount of conflict, as per voter preferences. By proposing basic axioms to capture this objective, we show that none of the prominent multiwinner voting rules meet t…
We consider the notions of agreement, diversity, and polarization in ordinal elections (that is, in elections where voters rank the candidates). While (computational) social choice offers good measures of agreement between the voters, such measures for the other two notions are lacking. We attempt t…
We study the properties of elections that have a given position matrix (in such elections each candidate is ranked on each position by a number of voters specified in the matrix). We show that counting elections that generate a given position matrix is #P-complete. Consequently, sampling such elect…
Given an initial resource allocation, where some agents may envy others or where a different distribution of resources might lead to higher social welfare, our goal is to improve the allocation without reassigning resources. We consider a sharing concept allowing resources being shared with social n…
Electing a single committee of a small size is a classical and well-understood voting situation. Being interested in a sequence of committees, we introduce two time-dependent multistage models based on simple scoring-based voting. Therein, we are given a sequence of voting profiles (stages) over the…
The NP-hard Material Consumption Scheduling Problem and closely related problems have been thoroughly studied since the 1980's. Roughly speaking, the problem deals with minimizing the makespan when scheduling jobs that consume non-renewable resources. We focus on the single-machine case without pree…
In parliamentary elections, parties compete for a limited, typically fixed number of seats. We study the complexity of the following bribery-style problem: Given the distribution of votes among the parties, what is the smallest number of voters that need to be convinced to vote for our party, so tha…