NeurIPS 2025poster0 citations
Strategic Cost Selection in Participatory Budgeting
Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Grzegorz Lisowski, Piotr Skowron, Stanisław Szufa, Mateusz Szwagierczak
Abstract
We study strategic behavior of project proposers in the context of approval-based participatory budgeting (PB). In our model we assume that the votes are fixed and known and the proposers want to set as high project prices as possible, provided that their projects get selected and the prices are not below the minimum costs of their delivery. We study the existence of pure Nash equilibria (NE) in such games, focusing on the AV/Cost, Phragmen, and Method of Equal Shares rules. We also provide an experimental study of cost selection on real-life PB election data.
Participatory BudgetingSocial ChoiceGame TheoryEquilibria
BibTeX
@inproceedings{
faliszewski2025strategic,
title={Strategic Cost Selection in Participatory Budgeting},
author={Piotr Faliszewski and {\L}ukasz Janeczko and Andrzej Kaczmarczyk and Grzegorz Lisowski and Piotr Skowron and Stanis{\l}aw Szufa and Mateusz Szwagierczak},
booktitle={The Thirty-ninth Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems},
year={2025},
url={https://openreview.net/forum?id=lB8YNp1YWv}
}