IJCAI 2024poster0 citations
Voting by Axioms (Extended Abstract)
Marie Christin Schmidtlein, Ulle Endriss
Abstract
We develop an approach for collective decision making from first principles. In this approach, rather than using a---necessarily imperfect---voting rule to map any given scenario where individual agents report their preferences into a collective decision, we identify for every concrete such scenario the most appealing set of normative principles (known as axioms in social choice theory) that would entail a unique decision and then implement that decision. We analyse some of the fundamental properties of this new approach, from both an algorithmic and a normative point of view.
Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Computational social choice
BibTeX
@inproceedings{ijcai2024p941,
title = {Voting by Axioms (Extended Abstract)},
author = {Schmidtlein, Marie Christin and Endriss, Ulle},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-24}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization},
editor = {Kate Larson},
pages = {8455--8459},
year = {2024},
month = {8},
note = {Sister Conferences Best Papers},
doi = {10.24963/ijcai.2024/941},
url = {https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2024/941},
}