6 accepted papers
We develop an approach for collective decision making from first principles. In this approach, rather than using a---necessarily imperfect---voting rule to map any given scenario where individual agents report their preferences into a collective decision, we identify for every concrete such scenario…
In the context of social choice theory, we develop a tableau-based calculus for reasoning about voting rules. This calculus can be used to obtain structured explanations for why a given set of axioms justifies a given election outcome for a given profile of voter preferences. We then show how to ope…
We present an online demonstration tool illustrating a general approach to computing justifications for accepting a given decision when confronted with the preferences of several agents. Such a justification consists of a set of axioms providing a normative basis for the decision, together with a st…
In the context of aggregating intervals reflecting the views of several agents into a single interval, we investigate the impact of the form of representation chosen for the intervals involved. Specifically, we ask whether there are natural rules we can define both as rules that aggregate separately…
Condorcet extensions have long held a prominent place in social choice theory. A Condorcet extension will return the Condorcet winner as the unique winner whenever such an alternative exists. However, the definition of a Condorcet extension does not take into account possible manipulation by the vot…
We introduce an end-to-end model for participatory budgeting grounded in social choice theory. Our model accounts for the interplay between the two stages commonly encountered in real-life partici- patory budgeting. In the first stage participants pro- pose projects to be shortlisted, while in…