Simon Rey — accepted AI-conference papers

2024

Guide to Numerical Experiments on Elections in Computational Social Choice

Niclas Boehmer, Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Grzegorz Lisowski, Grzegorz Pierczyński +4

IJCAI 2024poster

We analyze how numerical experiments regarding elections were conducted within computational social choice literature (focusing on papers published in the IJCAI, AAAI, and AAMAS conferences). We analyze the sizes of the studied elections and the methods of generating preference data, thereby making…

Cited by 9 Source ↗PDF ↗code ↗Scholar ↗

2022

Let’s Agree to Agree: Targeting Consensus for Incomplete Preferences through Majority Dynamics

Sirin Botan, Simon Rey, Zoi Terzopoulou

IJCAI 2022poster

We study settings in which agents with incomplete preferences need to make a collective decision. We focus on a process of majority dynamics where issues are addressed one at a time and undecided agents follow the opinion of the majority. We assess the effects of this process on various consens…

Cited by 1 Source ↗PDF ↗code ↗Scholar ↗

2021

Fairness in Long-Term Participatory Budgeting

Martin Lackner, Jan Maly, Simon Rey

IJCAI 2021poster

Participatory Budgeting (PB) processes are usually designed to span several years, with referenda for new budget allocations taking place regularly. This paper presents a first formal framework for long-term PB, based on a sequence of budgeting problems as main input. We introduce a theory of fairne…

Cited by 30 Source ↗PDF ↗Scholar ↗

2021

Shortlisting Rules and Incentives in an End-to-End Model for Participatory Budgeting

Simon Rey, Ulle Endriss, Ronald de Haan

IJCAI 2021poster

We introduce an end-to-end model for participatory budgeting grounded in social choice theory. Our model accounts for the interplay between the two stages commonly encountered in real-life partici- patory budgeting. In the first stage participants pro- pose projects to be shortlisted, while in…

Cited by 14 Source ↗PDF ↗Scholar ↗

2020

Almost Group Envy-free Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Chores

Haris Aziz, Simon Rey

IJCAI 2020poster

We consider a multi-agent resource allocation setting in which an agent's utility may decrease or increase when an item is allocated. We take the group envy-freeness concept that is well-established in the literature and present stronger and relaxed versions that are especially suitable for the allo…

Cited by 0 Source ↗PDF ↗Scholar ↗