Regularized Conventions: Equilibrium Computation as a Model of Pragmatic Reasoning
Athul Jacob, Gabriele Farina, Jacob Andreas
Abstract
We present a game-theoretic model of pragmatics that we call ReCo (for Regularized Conventions). This model formulates pragmatic communication as a game in which players are rewarded for communicating successfully and penalized for deviating from a shared, “default” semantics. As a result, players assign utterances context-dependent meanings that jointly optimize communicative success and naturalness with respect to speakers’ and listeners’ background knowledge of language. By using established game-theoretic tools to compute equilibrium strategies for this game, we obtain principled pragmatic language generation procedures with formal guarantees of communicative success. Across several datasets capturing real and idealized human judgments about pragmatic implicature, ReCo matches, or slightly improves upon, predictions made by Iterated Best Response and Rational Speech Acts models of language understanding.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{jacob-etal-2024-regularized,
title = "Regularized Conventions: Equilibrium Computation as a Model of Pragmatic Reasoning",
author = "Jacob, Athul and
Farina, Gabriele and
Andreas, Jacob",
editor = "Duh, Kevin and
Gomez, Helena and
Bethard, Steven",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2024 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies (Volume 1: Long Papers)",
month = jun,
year = "2024",
address = "Mexico City, Mexico",
publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
url = "https://aclanthology.org/2024.naacl-long.163/",
doi = "10.18653/v1/2024.naacl-long.163",
pages = "2944--2955"
}