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Bhuvesh Kumar

4 accepted papers

2025

Private Mechanism Design via Quantile Estimation

ICLR 2025poster

We investigate the problem of designing differentially private (DP), revenue-maximizing single item auction. Specifically, we consider broadly applicable settings in mechanism design where agents' valuation distributions are **independent**, **non-identical**, and can be either **bounded** or **unbo…

Cited by 0SourcePDFScholar
2019

Learning Auctions with Robust Incentive Guarantees

NeurIPS 2019poster

We study the problem of learning Bayesian-optimal revenue-maximizing auctions. The classical approach to maximizing revenue requires a known prior distribution on the demand of the bidders, although recent work has shown how to replace the knowledge of a prior distribution with a polynomial sample.…

Cited by 29SourcePDFScholar