6 accepted papers
We provide mechanisms and new metric distortion bounds for line-up elections. In such elections, a set of n voters, k candidates, and ell positions are all located in a metric space. The goal is to choose a set of candidates and assign them to different positions, so as to minimize the total cost of…
We consider a social choice setting in which agents and alternatives are represented by points in a metric space, and the cost of an agent for an alternative is the distance between the corresponding points in the space. The goal is to choose a single alternative to (approximately) minimize the soci…
We study the classic facility location setting, where we are given n clients and m possible facility locations in some arbitrary metric space, and want to choose a location to build a facility. The exact same setting also arises in spatial social choice, where voters are the clients and the goal is…
The notion of distortion in social choice problems has been defined to measure the loss in efficiency---typically measured by the utilitarian social welfare, the sum of utilities of the participating agents---due to having access only to limited information about the preferences of the agents. We su…
We study a coordination game motivated by the formation of Internet Exchange Points (IXPs), in which agents choose which facilities to join. Joining the same facility as other agents you communicate with has benefits, but different facilities have different costs for each agent. Thus, the players wi…
We study a model of proxy voting where the candidates, voters, and proxies are all located on the real line, and instead of voting directly, each voter delegates its vote to the closest proxy. The goal is to find a set of proxies that is theta-representative, which entails that for any voter located…