26 accepted papers
Core stability is a natural and well-studied notion for group fairness in multi-winner voting, where the task is to select a committee from a pool of candidates. We study the setting where voters either approve or disapprove of each candidate; here, it remains a major open problem whether a core-sta
We characterize the maximum likelihood that two voting rule outcomes are different and that the winner of one voting rule is the loser of another (implying that they are {\em drastically different}) on positional scoring rules, Condorcet winner/loser, Copeland, Ranked Pairs, and STV (Single Transfer
In this paper, we investigate tradeoffs among differential privacy (DP) and several important voting axioms: Pareto efficiency, SD-efficiency, PC-efficiency, Condorcet criterion, and Condorcet loser criterion. We provide upper and lower bounds on the two-way tradeoffs between DP and each axiom. We a
The (group) no-show paradox refers to the undesirable situation where a group of agents have incentive to abstain from voting to make the winner more favorable to them. To understand whether it is a critical concern in practice, in this paper, we take a computational approach by examining the comp…
An important question in elections is determining whether a candidate can be a winner when some votes are absent. We study this determining winner with absent votes (WAV) problem with elections that take top-truncated ballots. We show that the WAV problem is NP-complete for single transferable vote,…
Studying the computational complexity and designing fast algorithms for determining winners under voting rules are classical and fundamental questions in computational social choice. In this paper, we accelerate voting by leveraging quantum computation: we propose a quantum-accelerated voting algori…
We study strategic behavior in iterative plurality voting for multiple issues under uncertainty. We introduce a model synthesizing simultaneous multi-issue voting with local dominance theory, in which agents repeatedly update their votes based on sets of vote profiles they deem possible, and determi…
Designing private voting rules is an important and pressing problem for trustworthy democracy. In this paper, under the framework of differential privacy, we propose a novel famliy of randomized voting rules based on the well-known Condorcet method, and focus on three classes of voting rules in this…
For the assignment problem where multiple indivisible items are allocated to a group of agents given their ordinal preferences, we design randomized mechanisms that satisfy first-choice maximality (FCM), i.e., maximizing the number of agents assigned their first choices, together with Pareto efficie…
Truth discovery is a general name for a broad range of statistical methods aimed to extract the correct answers to questions, based on multiple answers coming from noisy sources. For example, workers in a crowdsourcing platform. In this paper, we consider an extremely simple heuristic for estimating…
Voting is used widely to aggregate preferences to make a collective decision. In this paper, we focus on evaluating and designing voting rules that support both the privacy of the voting agents and a notion of fairness over such agents. First, we introduce a novel notion of group fairness and adopt…
The Condorcet criterion (CC) is a classical and well-accepted criterion for voting. Unfortunately, it is incompatible with many other desiderata including participation (PAR), half-way monotonicity (HM), Maskin monotonicity (MM), and strategy-proofness (SP). Such incompatibilities are often known as…
Random Utility Models (RUMs), which subsume Plackett-Luce model (PL) as a special case, are among the most popular models for preference learning. In this paper, we consider RUMs with features and their mixtures, where each alternative has a vector of features, possibly different across agents. Such…
When aggregating logically interconnected judgements from n agents, the result might be logically inconsistent. This phenomenon is known as the doctrinal paradox, which plays a central role in the field of judgement aggregation. Previous work has mostly focused on the worst-case analysis of the doct…
Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) provides a strong and intuitive guarantee of fairness in the allocation of indivisible goods. But whether such allocations always exist or whether they can be efficiently computed remains an important open question. We study the existence and computation of EFX in…
We study a model of proxy voting where the candidates, voters, and proxies are all located on the real line, and instead of voting directly, each voter delegates its vote to the closest proxy. The goal is to find a set of proxies that is theta-representative, which entails that for any voter located…
Recent work in iterative voting has defined the additive dynamic price of anarchy (ADPoA) as the difference in social welfare between the truthful and worst-case equilibrium profiles resulting from repeated strategic manipulations. While iterative plurality has been shown to only return alternatives…
We initiate the work towards a comprehensive picture of the worst average-case satisfaction of voting axioms in semi-random models, to provide a finer and more realistic foundation for comparing voting rules. We adopt the semi-random model and formulation in [Xia 2020], where an adversary chooses…
The computational complexity of winner determination under common voting rules is a classical and fundamental topic in the field of computational social choice. Previous work has established the NP-hardness of winner determination under some commonly-studied voting rules, such as the Kemeny rule and…
Differential privacy has been widely applied to provide privacy guarantees by adding random noise to the function output. However, it inevitably fails in many high-stakes voting scenarios, where voting rules are required to be deterministic. In this work, we present the first framework for answerin…
We address the following question in this paper: “What are the most robust statistical methods for social choice?” By leveraging the theory of uniformly least favorable distributions in the Neyman-Pearson framework to finite models and randomized tests, we characterize uniformly most powerful (UMP)…
We develop a framework that leverages the smoothed complexity analysis by Spielman and Teng to circumvent paradoxes and impossibility theorems in social choice, motivated by modern applications of social choice powered by AI and ML. For Condrocet’s paradox, we prove that the smoothed likelihood of t…
Mixtures of ranking models have been widely used for heterogeneous preferences. However, learning a mixture model is highly nontrivial, especially when the dataset consists of partial orders. In such cases, the parameter of the model may not be even identifiable. In this paper, we focus on three pop…
Direct democracy, where each voter casts one vote, fails when the average voter competence falls below 50%. This happens in noisy settings when voters have limited information. Representative democracy, where voters choose representatives to vote, can be an elixir in both these situations. We introd…
We propose a novel and flexible rank-breaking-then-composite-marginal-likelihood (RBCML) framework for learning random utility models (RUMs), which include the Plackett-Luce model. We characterize conditions for the objective function of RBCML to be strictly log-concave by proving that strict log-co…
In this paper we address the identifiability and efficient learning problems of finite mixtures of Plackett-Luce models for rank data. We prove that for any k≥2, the mixture of k Plackett-Luce models for no more than 2k-1 alternatives is non-identifiable and this bound is tight for k=2. For generic…