Hugo Gilbert

2 accepted papers

2025

Constrained Serial Dictatorships Can Be Fair

Sylvain Bouveret, Hugo Gilbert, Jérôme Lang, Guillaume Méroué

IJCAI 2025

When allocating indivisible items to agents, it is known that the only strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy a set of rather mild conditions are constrained serial dictatorships: given a fixed order over agents, at each step the designated agent chooses a given number of items (depending on her posi

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2023

Measuring a Priori Voting Power in Liquid Democracy

Rachael Colley, Théo Delemazure, Hugo Gilbert

IJCAI 2023poster

We introduce new power indices to measure the a priori voting power of voters in liquid democracy elections where an underlying network restricts delegations. We argue that our power indices are natural extensions of the standard Penrose-Banzhaf index in simple voting games. We show that computing…

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