6 accepted papers
A common criticism of liquid democracy within the relevant academic literature is that delegation cycles can occur, seemingly resulting in unused voting power. Yet, practitioners argue that delegation cycles are not only unproblematic but are even formed intentionally by participants. To bring theor
We introduce new power indices to measure the a priori voting power of voters in liquid democracy elections where an underlying network restricts delegations. We argue that our power indices are natural extensions of the standard Penrose-Banzhaf index in simple voting games. We show that computing…
In rank aggregation, members of a population rank issues to decide which are collectively preferred. We focus instead on identifying divisive issues that express disagreements among the preferences of individuals. We analyse the properties of our divisiveness measures and their relation to existing…
Iterative voting allows a group of agents to take a collective decision in a dynamic fashion: a series of plurality elections are staged, making the relative scores of the candidates public after each round. Voters can thus adjust their ballots at each step until the process converges (or a maximal…
Liquid democracy bridges the gap between direct and representative democracy by allowing agents to vote directly on an issue or delegate to a trusted voter. Yet, when applied to votes on multiple interconnected issues, liquid democracy can lead agents to submit inconsistent votes. Two approaches are…
We propose a generalisation of liquid democracy in which a voter can either vote directly on the issues at stake, delegate her vote to another voter, or express complex delegations to a set of trusted voters. By requiring a ranking of desirable delegations and a backup vote from each voter, we are…