Mohammad Mahdavi — accepted AI-conference papers

2026

Bi-Criteria Metric Distortion

Kiarash Banihashem, Diptarka Chakraborty, Shayan Chashm Jahan, Iman Gholami, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Mohammad Mahdavi +1

ICLR 2026poster

Selecting representatives based on voters' preferences is a fundamental problem in social choice theory. While cardinal utility functions offer a detailed representation of preferences, voters often cannot precisely quantify their affinity towards a given candidate. As a result, modern voting system…

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2026

Optimally Curating an Event

Mohammad Hajiaghayi, Sebastien Lahaie, Mohammad Mahdavi, Suho Shin

IJCAI 2026

We study the optimal design of a self-financing event, a problem that requires balancing the recruitment of costly, positive-value participants with revenue-generating agents who may impose negative values on the event. We introduce a novel two-sided mechanism design framework with plus agents equip

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2024

Regret Analysis of Repeated Delegated Choice

Mohammad Hajiaghayi, Mohammad Mahdavi, Keivan Rezaei, Suho Shin

AAAI 2024technical

We present a study on a repeated delegated choice problem, which is the first to consider an online learning variant of Kleinberg and Kleinberg, EC'18. In this model, a principal interacts repeatedly with an agent who possesses an exogenous set of solutions to search for efficient ones. Each solutio…

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